MAFE Migrations between Africa and Europe

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THE DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION BETWEEN AFRICA AND EUROPE: THE DR CONGO

FLAHAUX Marie-Laurence, Université catholique de Louvain

GONZALEZ-FERRER Amparo (CSIC-Spain)

OBUCINA Ognjen (UPF-Spain)

SCHOUMAKER Bruno, Université catholique de Louvain

With the collaboration of MANGALU MOBHE Agbada (UCL)

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INTRODUCTION

The determinants of departures from DR Congo to Europe have barely been studied. Popular knowledge tends to associate migration with poverty, unemployment, and political and economic troubles in the origin country. Policy documents sometimes refer to such 'determinants' as the root causes of migration, or the main pushes factors of migration. For instance, in its global approach to migration, the European commission (CEC, 2006, p.5) considers that a major challenge is "to tackle the main push factors for migration: poverty and the lack of job opportunities", and that "creating jobs in developing countries could significantly reduce migratory pressure from Africa". But little empirical evidence exists on the factors that lead people to migrate, from Africa in general, and more from DR Congo. Determinants of return migration are even less well known. Are they more likely among less economically integrated people, do they depend on the migrant's family situation, are they linked to the economic conditions in the home country? These are some of the questions addressed in this working paper.

In summary, the objective of this working paper is to identify important factors underlying the propensity to migrate from DR Congo to Belgium and UK, and to return from these European countries to DR Congo. Among these factors, we aim at distinguishing the role played by individual, household and contextual factors. In the first section, we present a brief history of political and economic changes in DR Congo, followed by a review of the literature on the determinants of departures and returns among Congolese. Data and descriptive analyses are then presented, and are followed by results of multivariate event history models. The results are divided into two main parts. The first one devoted to the analysis of migration out of DR Congo, and the second one to the analysis of return migration from Europe to Africa.

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

RECENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN DR CONGO

Since the country gained independence in 1960, Congo has experienced a series of economic downturns and episodes of political instability. Until the mid-1970's, the economic situation was fairly good—benefiting notably from high prices on world copper markets and large amounts of foreign direct investment. But beginning in the mid-1970s, the economic situation seriously deteriorated. The oil crisis, along with the collapse of the price of copper (and of other commodities) and bad economic policy, wiped out the benefits of the preceding period (Peemans, 1997; Nzisabira, 1997). The period was also characterized by political turmoil. The period from 1983 to 1989 started

with economic reforms and a slight increase in GDP, along with the beginnings of a structural adjustment program (Nzisabira, 1997; RDC et PNUD, 2000). However, the improvements did not last, and by the end of the 1980s, the country was experiencing negative GDP growth rates. This coincided with the end of the Cold War as well as major changes in the political situation in DR Congo.

TABLE 1 : BROAD PERIODS IN CONGO'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY

Period	**Political situation**	**Economic situation**
1960-1965	Political instability after independence	Stagnation
1965-1974	Mobutu seizes power. Relative political stability	Growth of the economy
1975-1982	Shaba wars in the late 1970s	Deterioration of the economy
1983-1989	Relative stability	Economic reforms and slow growth
1990-1996	End of Cold War, democratization process and start of serious political instability. Riots in the early 1990s, start of the first Congo war in 1996.	Economic deterioration, negative growth rates, decrease in international development aid.
1997-2002	Regime change (Mobutu replaced by L.D. Kabila), first and second Congo wars. Assassination of L.D. Kabila in 2001, replaced by his son J. Kabila.	Negative growth rates
2003-2009	End of the war, election in 2006 of Joseph Kabila.	Improvement of the economic situation, resumption of international aid

The 1990s is one of the darkest periods in Congo's recent political and economic history. The democratization process announced by Mobutu in April 1990 lagged and was accompanied by political instability. Riots erupted in 1991, shortly after the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* was set up to decide the future of the country (Hesselbein, 2007). In 1994, the war in Rwanda led to massive flows of people from Rwanda to DR Congo, which also contributed to political instability in DR Congo (Hesselbein, 2007). Two years later (1996), Laurent-Désiré Kabila led a rebellion with the support of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola (McCalpin, 2002). By May 1997, Mobutu had fled to Morocco and the rebellion had seized power. In 1998, another rebellion started in Eastern Congo—this time with the goal of deposing Kabila (Dunn, 2002). This marked the beginning of the Second Congo War, which was to last until 2003. Laurent-Désiré Kabila remained in power until he was assassinated in January 2001. He was replaced by his son Joseph, who made overtures to the international community, showing willingness to move towards peace (Putzel et al., 2008). Starting in 2002, violence went down significantly (Hesselbein, 2007); the Second Congo War officially ended in 2003. In 2006, elections were organized and Joseph Kabila was elected President. He also won the elections in 2011.

The 1990s were also characterized by rapid deterioration in the country's economic situation. The estimated GDP growth rate, which was already negative at the beginning of the period, decreased from -6.6% in 1990 to -14% in 1999. Congo's economy was struck by hyperinflation, and the country's public debt soared. Official development

aid also decreased drastically in the 1990s (Hesselbein, 2007; Mutamba Lukusa, 1999). During this period, the purchasing power of the Congolese population declined considerably. Since the year 2000, and especially since 2003, the economic context and living conditions of the population have slightly improved. In 2002, the country experienced positive GDP growth rates for the first time since 1995. The improvement in the economic situation is explained by the post-war reunification of the country, the resumption of international development aid, and a massive injection of foreign currency by the IMF (IMF, 2002). However, the living conditions of the Congolese population remain extremely difficult.

DETERMINANTS OF CONGOLESE MIGRATION

Few quantitative studies exist on Congolese migration, mainly because of the paucity of data on international migration from the country. Administrative sources in Western countries remain the main sources of quantitative data. Some small-scale quantitative surveys have been conducted, but most works on Congolese migration are based on qualitative data.

Existing quantitative work on Congolese migration is largely descriptive and focuses on the measurement of trends in migration, changes in destinations, and changes in the profiles of migrants. As highlighted in MAFE working paper 19, Congolese migration to Europe grew after independence in 1960 mainly to Belgium, and has undergone important transformations over the last five decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, migration to Belgium was viewed as temporary, and returns were the norm. The deterioration of the living conditions in the 1980s, and especially since the 1990s, has been accompanied by a strong decline in returns, transforming Congolese immigration in Europe into settlement migration (Schoonvaere, 2010). The profiles of Congolese migrants have also diversified in the past 25 years, particularly with a large influx of asylum seekers since the late 1980s (Schoonvaere, 2010). Irregular migration has also increased (Sumata, Trefon and Cogels, 2004; see also MAFE working paper 19) over the last decades.

DETERMINANTS OF DEPARTURE

The literature on the determinants of departures to Europe is limited. The links between periods of economic and political crisis and large influxes of Congolese asylum seekers in several European countries suggest that the deterioration of the economic and political conditions in the DR Congo has been an important determinant of emigration (Schoonvaere, 2010; Schoumaker, Vause, Mangalu, 2010). Some qualitative work with Congolese migrants or would-be Congolese migrants (in Europe or Africa) also emphasizes the role of the economic crisis and the lack of opportunities as causes of migration, particularly among young people (Bazonzi, 2010). Migration is not only seen as an opportunity by the migrants themselves, but it is also viewed as a collective strategy to diversify the income sources of the family

(Sumata, Trefon & Cogels, 2004). Qualitative work also suggests that it is not uncommon for families to contract heavy debts to finance a son's journey to Europe (Ngoie Tshibambe, 2008).

Beyond these contextual factors - related to economic and political crises - individual and family determinants have been little discussed. As highlighted in MAFE working paper 19, female Congolese migration to Europe has increased, and has even surpassed male migration to some destinations. In Belgium, Schoonvaere (2010) shows that since the late 1990s, the majority of Congolese migrants arriving in Belgium have been women (including asylum seekers). This feminization of migration suggests that female migration is increasingly related to factors other than family reunification, and that female autonomous migration has increased. Lututala (2006), in his survey of 122 Congolese migrants in Paris, reveals that the pattern of migration most frequently cited by women is familial, but that the economic reasons also often reflect a certain autonomy.

Education has also been shown to be positively related to migration among the Congolese. Schoonvaere (2010), in his study on Congolese immigration in Belgium, shows that Congolese migrants in Belgium have high levels of education, and higher than Congolese in DR Congo: Congolese migrants also disproportionately come from educated strata. Statistics on visas also indicate that visas for study reasons are quite common among the Congolese in Belgium (about 1/3 of visas in 2007), illustrating that education and migration are closely linked among Congolese migrants (Schoonvaere, 2010). To our knowledge, no quantitative studies have focused on migrants' living standards. However, the correlation between standard of living and education suggests that migrants come from better-off households than non-migrants in the DR Congo. However, the profiles of migrants have changed with the economic and political crises, and according to Sumata (2002, p.16), starting in the 1990s, "both rich and poor people had no choice but to seek political asylum". We have not found any studies that have examined the relationship between employment and migration to Europe among Congolese people.

The role of social and family networks in the propensity to migrate is also attested, at least indirectly, by visa statistics. Belgian data indicate that more than half of visas issued in 2007 to Congolese nationals were for family reunification (Schoonvaere, 2010). The presence of immediate family (spouse, children) in Europe is clearly a crucial element in migration. The role of members of the broader social network, beyond the nuclear family, is not captured by visa statistics. However, they may also influence migration by providing information, hosting migrants, etc. Survey data are essential to measure the broader social network's influence on migration.

DETERMINANTS OF RETURNS

The determinants of returns are even less well known than those of departure. Several studies suggest a significant reduction in returns of Congolese migrants from Europe over the last two decades (see MAFE working paper 19). Using the Belgian population register, Schoonvaere (2010) notes that Congolese migration from Belgium (considered mainly as returns) has decreased significantly since the 1990s. This decline, which coincided with the deterioration of living conditions in DR Congo, suggests that the economic and political context in the DR Congo is probably an important determinant of returns and non-returns. Research among Congolese migrants in Paris (Lututala, 2006) also shows that intentions to return are very low, notably because of the deterioration of the situation in Congo. Finally, several pieces of qualitative research indicate that return is not at the center of the migration project of the Congolese (Banzonzi, 2010; Sumata, Tréfon and Cogels, 2004). Even though returns have decreased, they are mainly made up of spontaneous rather than forced returns (Flahaux, 2013). Between 50 and 100 undocumented Congolese migrants are deported from Belgium each year (81 in 2006, 70 in 2007, 44 in 2008: CECLR, 2008), and the number of migrants assisted by "voluntary return" programs is also relatively small (Ngoie Tshibambe & Lelu, 2009).

Little information is available on other determinants of returns. Level of education, for example, has not been studied quantitatively. In his study of Congolese migration in Belgium, Schoonvaere (2010) notes that international emigration from Belgium is more common among Congolese who live near universities, suggesting that students are more likely to return than other types of Congolese migrants, but the lack of individual data makes it impossible to draw any firm conclusions on this issue. Some studies also show differences between men and women. Schoonvaere (2010) shows, for instance, that among Belgium Congolese migrants, men more often return than women, particularly since the 2000s. To our knowledge, the role of the family and social environment in returns, and in particular the presence of close relatives in the destination country has not been studied quantitatively. Qualitative work stresses, however, that—contrary to the 1960s and 1970s—families in the DR Congo encourage migrants to stay abroad, to provide for the financial needs of the family at home (Bongo-Pasi Moké Sangol and Tsakala Munikengi 2004). In this sense, the presence of the family in the Congo may be viewed as a deterrent to return, especially if they can remit. The presence of family in Europe may also discourage return, insofar as family ties in the origin country are lower. Beyond the need to remain abroad to send remittances, the fear of shame on returning empty-handed may lead migrants not to return to Congo (Sumata, Trefon & Cogels, 2004; Banzonzi, 2010).

The influence of integration in Europe - from a labour market or administrative point of view (papers, citizenship) - on the return of Congolese migrants has also not yet been studied.

DEFINITIONS AND ANALYSE SAMPLES

In this section we summarize the definitions and the analyse samples, that are detailed in the MAFE working paper 22.

Analyses of departures are restricted to first adult direct migrations out of DR Congo to Belgium or the UK for a stay of more than one year. Migrations that involved intermediate stays of more than 1 year in other countries (in Europe or in Africa) are excluded from our sample and analyses.

TABLE 2. FIRST ADULT MIGRATION OF CONGOLESE IN MAFE BIOGRAPHIC DATASET

	N	% Weighted
Non-migrants	1372	89
First adult migration to other African country	289	8
First adult migration to other destination	67	1
First adult migration to selected destinations in Europe (UK or Belgium)	333	2
Total	2061	100

Table 2 describes the sample utilized for the analyses of departure from DR Congo. In the multivariate analyses that follow, these individuals whose first adult migration out of DR Congo took them to none of our selected destinations in Europe will be considered as non-migrants during the time they resided in DR Congo and will be censored from then on.

Analyses of return are restricted to return from Belgium and the UK to DR Congo, with no intermediate stay in other countries. Unfortunately, our datasets included a small number of returns. For this reason and in order to maximize the number of events, we will consider as a relevant return for our analyses both *long returns* (duration of one year or more) PLUS also *short returns with the intention of re-installation* from one of our selected destinations in Europe (Belgium/UK) to DR Congo.

As can be seen in Table 3, 29% of our sample's Congolese migrants residing in Belgium/UK returned to DR Congo after a first stay in one of these two countries. The rest, 71%, had still not returned by the time of the survey. However, it is important to note that they were all still at risk of returning.

TABLE 3. RETURNS OF CONGOLESE MIGRANTS FROM SELECTED EUROPEAN DESTINATIONS (BELGIUM/UK) TO DR CONGO

		N	% weighted
1st long stay in selected European	Individuals who returned from a selected European destination to their home country	50	29

destinations	Individuals in selected European destinations who never returned to their home country	418	71
	Total individuals at risk	468	100
All long stays in European selected destinations	Returns from selected European destinations to DR Congo	54	29
	Spells of stay in selected European destinations still ongoing	426	71
	Total spells at risk	480	100

THE PROFILE OF MIGRANTS AND RETURNING MIGRANTS

The descriptive statistics compare the profiles of Congolese migrants with those of individuals who have not migrated (Table 4), and those of migrants who have returned to DR Congo with those of migrants continuing to live in Belgium and the United Kingdom (Table 5). This approach – prior to multivariate analyses of the determinants of departures and returns - reveals a few key differences between non-migrants, migrants, and returned migrants.

MIGRANTS: EDUCATED, BETTER-OFF, EXTENDED NETWORKS, AND LESS LIKELY TO HAVE STARTED A FAMILY

Examination of levels of education and living standards confirm that Congolese migrants living in Europe come from more socially and economically privileged backgrounds than non-migrants. Half of migrants had completed some post-secondary education before leaving, whereas only 20% of non-migrants obtain such qualifications by the age of 30 (Table 4). Congolese migrants in Europe also tend to come from well-off households: 89% of migrants declared that their household had enough means to satisfy their basic needs in the year preceding their migration, whereas only 69% of non-migrants were in this situation at the age of 30 years.

In terms of employment status, however, migrants and non-migrants do not differ significantly. Fifty-four percent of migrants were employed before leaving, whereas among non-migrants this proportion is 62%. Similarly, no significant difference was found in the possession of a property (housing, land) or a business. Material and economic ties do not seem to act as a brake on migration, nor do their potential economic advantages seem to encourage it.

TABLE 4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CONGOLESE MIGRANTS AT TIME OF MIGRATION TO EUROPE COMPARED TO CONGOLESE NON-MIGRANTS

	Migrants to Europe	Non-migrants
% with a university degree	51%	20%

Sufficient resources to cover basic needs	89%	69%
% employed	54%	62%
Asset ownership	14%	21%
Partnership (%)	45%	61%
Partner in Europe	7%	0%
Children	56%	64%
Children in Europe	7%	0%
Other relatives or friends in Europe	46%	10%
N	475	1595

In order to neutralize the potential effect of the age differences between migrants at the time of their first migration, and non-migrants at the time of the survey, the characteristics of Congolese migrants are computed for the year before their migration, and compared with the characteristics of the Congolese non-migrants when they were 30 (the mean age at first adult Congolese migration to the selected countries in Europe minus 1), or their age at the time of the survey in the case they had not yet reached 30 when we surveyed them.

Biographic surveys, weighted percentages.

Finally, the family situation of Congolese migrants on the eve of their departure differed from that of non-migrants in several respects. Migrants are less likely to have been in union than non-migrants (45% versus 61%), and the proportion of migrants who had children before leaving is slightly lower than the corresponding percentage among 30-year-old non-migrants (56% versus 64%). These results suggest that family ties in DR Congo reduce the probability of migration, or that a migratory project delays the constitution of a family. However, the percentage of people with a partner or children in Europe is larger among migrants than among non-migrants, illustrating the potential influence of family ties across continents as a determinant of migration. Finally, substantially more migrants (46%) than non-migrants (10%) had a social network beyond partner and children in the destination country before migration, also suggesting an influence of the contact circle on migration.

RETURN MIGRANTS: MORE EDUCATED, WITH CHILDREN IN THE ORIGIN COUNTRY AND WITH LEGAL STATUS IN EUROPE

The profile of returned migrants can be summarized as follows: mostly educated, with children in DR Congo while they were away as migrants, and legal residents of the destination country on their return (Table 5). The comparison of the situation of migrants who have returned to DR Congo with that of migrants residing in Belgium and the United Kingdom, six years after their arrival in one of the two latter countries, shows that 81% of returned migrants hold a post-secondary qualification, versus 63% of those who have remained in Europe. While this could reflect a stronger tendency to return among the more highly educated, it should be noted that returns were more frequent in the 1980s, and that migrants at the time were more educated. This also reflects the fact that migrants who moved for study reasons are much more likely to return: 77% of the return migrants had migrated for studies, against only 19% among

non-returnees. All migrants who return are legal residents of Belgium or the United Kingdom. Returned migrants are more likely to have had a child in the DR Congo than migrants who remained in Europe (64% vs. 23%), and are also more likely to have a partner in Congo (32% vs. 11%). Finally, return migrants are less likely to have remitted. Return migrants and migrants living in Europe are not distinguished, on the other hand, by employment status or the household's economic situation (in the destination country).

TABLE 5. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CONGOLESE RETURN MIGRANTS FROM EUROPE COMPARED TO NON RETURNEES (IN EUROPE)

	Return migrants from Europe	Non returnees
Gender (% males)	56%	51%
% with a university degree	81%	63%
Employed	35%	32%
Sufficient resources to cover basic needs	82%	72%
Asset ownership	11%	21%
Partnership (%)	69%	56%
Partner in DR Congo	32%	11%
Children	72%	65%
Children in DR Congo	64%	23%
Legal status	100%	86%
Remitted	26%	46%
Visited home	0%	10%
Decision by ego	21%	19%
Financed by ego	1%	18%
Migration for studies	77%	19%
Political reasons	1%	22%
N	47	1595
In order to neutralize the potential effect of the differences in duration of stay, between return migrants at the time of their return, and migrants still in Europe, the characteristics of return migrants are computed for the year before their return, and compared with the characteristics of the Congolese migrants in Belgium and the UK at time 'date of arrival plus 6' (or less if they had not yet stayed for 6 years or had returned earlier), since return migrants had stayed 6 years on average.		

THE DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION BETWEEN AFRICA AND EUROPE

While descriptive statistics are useful to show differences between migrants and non-migrants, they do not allow causal interpretation, notably because some of the explanatory variables are correlated. Multivariate event history models are fitted to identify the determinants of departures and returns (Table 6 and Table 7).

Determinants of departures are presented in Table 6. First of all, multivariate analysis indicate that individuals are twice less likely to leave DR Congo to migrate to Belgium and the UK since 1990 than they were before.

Gender does not appear to be a determinant of the departure of Congolese to Belgium and the United Kingdom. The non-significant effect of gender is consistent with the increasing share of females among Congolese migrants to Europe, and the fact that they are now as likely to move to Europe as males (Schoonvaere, 2010; Vause, 2012). Age has no strong effect either. The 25-34 are slightly more likely to move than their younger and older counterparts, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Individuals' level of education, on the other hand, has an impact on their probability of migration. The most educated Congolese—that is, those who have already completed some studies at the tertiary level—are much more likely to leave their country than those who have not gone to school or who stopped at the primary school level. All other things being equal, the former group is eight times more likely to migrate than the latter. As highlighted in MAFE working paper 19, this is notably related to their greater economic resources, and their relative advantage compared to uneducated people in obtaining a visa (essentially to pursue higher education), as well as their greater ability to capitalize on their qualifications in Western countries (see MAFE working paper 27). They are not especially disadvantaged on the labour market in Congo (unemployment levels are lower among educated people), but the gap between their aspirations and their situation is probably greater and encourages their migration. The model also shows that, all else being equal, people with secondary education are not more likely to migrate than their less educated counterparts. Higher education is thus a decisive factor in migratory departure.

TABLE 6. DETERMINANTS OF DEPARTURE FROM DR CONGO TO SELECTED DESTINATIONS IN EUROPE (BELGIUM OR UK). DISCRETE TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION (ODDS RATIOS)

Variables	Categories	Gross Effects	Net effects
Period	Since 1990 (ref. before 1990)		0,43**
Age	Ref.: Younger than 25		
	25-34	1.66**	1.42
	35 and over	0.71	0.73
Gender	Female (ref. male)	0.89	0.96
Education	Ref.: primary & less		
	Some secondary	2.29***	1.19
	Some tertiary	20.58***	9.98***
Employment	Employed (ref. no)	0.88	1.48
Living Standard	Suf. for basic needs (ref. no)	3.44***	2.59***
Assets	Some asset in DR Congo (ref. no)	0.52***	0.69
Partner	Has a partner in Europe (ref. no)	106.76***	67.76***
	Has a partner in Origin (ref. no)	0.26**	0.43**
	Has a partner in Other country (ref. no)	8.14**	10.16**
Children	Has a child in Europe (ref. no)	14.54***	17.29***
	Has a child in Origin (ref. no)	0.49**	0.88
	Has a child in Other country (ref. no)	1.04	0.33**
Relatives	Has other relatives/friends in Europe (ref.no)	10.80***	8.47***
GDP growth	GDP growth rate in 2 previous years in DR Congo	0.96	0.93**
	Person-year observations	40271	40271
	Events	333	333
	Egos	2061	2061
Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$			

Financial or economic capital plays a certain role in departure to Europe, but its importance depends on how it is captured. Clearly, the economic conditions of the household have a powerful effect on the probability of leaving the Congo. Individuals whose households possess means sufficient or more than sufficient to meet their basic needs are two times more likely to migrate than those who are not in such conditions. Indeed, migration is very expensive (there are administrative fees, travel and moving costs, etc.) and only members of households which are not in great need stand a chance of being able to leave for Europe. However, employment status per se did not emerge as a determinant of migratory departure. This lack of a relationship is no doubt linked, on the one hand, to the great diversity of employment situations (which range from unstable odd jobs to very stable and well-paid positions) and non-employed situations (housewives, students…) and on the other to the opposing potential effects of employment. A satisfactory job can provide the resources needed to migrate; it can also, however, act as a brake on migration insofar as it may already satisfy professional aspirations. Finally, the possession of a house, land or a business is also not a determinant of Congolese migration: those who own property or a business in the country are not more likely to migrate. Here again, opposing effects are theoretically possible: properties constitute at once an economic resource that can be drawn on for migratory purposes and a material tie that can impede migration.

Multivariate analyses showed that social capital is a very strong determinant of departure. Having a spouse in Belgium or the United Kingdom multiplied the chances of migrating to the these countries. The odd ratio is the largest in the regression, and illustrates the idea that Congolese couples do not wish to live apart. Even though multi-residence remains a common living arrangement for Congolese families (see MAFE working paper 31), the process of urbanization, joined to the surge of new Christian churches, tends to reinforce nuclear families and co-residence ways of living of their members (Ngondo 1996). It seems individuals do not wish to live far from their spouses for extended periods, or at least much less than migrants from other countries (e.g. Senegalese migrants, see MAFE working paper 33). If the man and the woman live in DR Congo at the beginning of their union, the man often migrates first, and strongly increases the likelihood of migration of the spouse. Analyses also show that when the spouse is in the origin country, the probability of migration is cut in half. Migrants who are not in union, correspondingly, are more likely to leave than those who live with a partner in DR Congo. In the few cases where an individual's spouse is located in a country other than Belgium or the United Kingdom, the chances of migration also increase; other destination countries can be a way for couples to be closer together and see one another more often.

As with spouses, analyses show that having a child in Belgium or the United Kingdom strongly multiplies the chances of migrating there (odds ratio of 19). Children who migrate before their parents have most often already reached the age of majority and, until recently, Belgian law on family reunification allowed parents to join their Congolese children who had become naturalized citizens of Belgium (Nappa, 2011). Children who are in a good position in the destination country can help their parents financially, and in return the parents can help them out by taking care of their grandchildren, for example. Having one or more children in the country of origin, on the other hand, has no impact on the chances of migration. This result probably reflects the diversity of situations. While a priori it should be easier to migrate when one has no dependent children, having a child need not be an obstacle, as it is possible to entrust the child to the spouse or another family member who lives in the country. Having a larger number of children, however, should make migration more difficult. Moreover, children's age and degree of autonomy also affects the probability of their parents' leaving DR Congo. Furthermore, having a child in a country other than Belgium or the United Kingdom diminishes the chances of migration to one of these two countries. This influence of this factor is due to the fact that parents, if they migrate, are more likely to want to join their children.

The wider social network is also significant: the analysis shows that Congolese who have contacts beyond the nuclear family in Belgium and the United Kingdom are seven times more likely to migrate there, all other things being equal. The network can play a key role in the migratory trajectories of the Congolese (Vause, 2012), and before departure it can be very useful, as a source of information on life in the destination country, in financing migration, and also as a landing point on arrival.

Finally, the results of the regression indicate that, when the mean level of the DR Congo's GDP grew for two years, the probability of leaving the country for Europe decreased. This shows that more Congolese migrate during periods of recession or economic crisis, and that they migrate less when there is economic growth in DR Congo, which is synonymous with recovery in terms of opportunities and employment. This is consistent with results from household data (MAFE working paper 19), that showed that migration to Europe increased essentially in the 1990s, at the worst time of the economic and political crises.

3.2. The determinants of return

Determinants of return are reported in Table 7. Congolese who migrate to the United Kingdom are more likely to return than those who go to Belgium, and the duration of migration does not determine returns, which shows that migrants' trajectories involve a diversity of situations. The period is an important factor of return, that reflects the context in the destination country, but also in the origin country. Migrants are less likely to return when the conditions in their home country are deteriorating, which is especially the case in DR Congo after 1990, when the country experienced strong political and economic troubles. Restrictive immigration policies implemented by destination countries also play an important role for the decision to return. Indeed, given the restrictive immigration policies, migrants do return less since 1990, because they know that it will be difficult to migrate again if they choose to return and if their reintegration process is problematic.

All else being equal, gender and age do not determine return to DR Congo[1].

The net effect of level of education shows that more educated individuals—those who had completed some post-secondary studies—are three times more likely to return to DR Congo. However, this effect disappears when the reason for migration, and more particularly that of migrating "for reasons of study," is taken into account. This indicates that it is less the level of education than migration for purposes of study that matters. Congolese with a high level of education who migrate directly to study are more likely to return, whereas those with the same level of education but who do not migrate for this purpose are not as likely to do so. Human capital acquired abroad through studies pursued there thus has a positive impact on return. Congolese migrants return to the country when they have acquired skills and qualifications in the destination country, because they thus have a greater chance of finding high-quality employment opportunities in DR Congo. However, returns among the highly educated have become increasingly rare (see MAFE working paper 19).

[1] In MAFE working paper 19, we showed with household data that females were a little less likely to return from Europe. The gross effect of gender on returns from Belgium and UK is consistent with that result (0.71), but is not significant.

TABLE 7. DETERMINANTS OF RETURN. DISCRETE TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION (ODDS RATIOS)

Variables	Categories	Gross Effects	Net Effects
Country	UK (ref. Belgium)	0.41	4.58*
Period	Since 1990 (ref. before 1990)		0,09***
Length of stay	Ref.: Length of stay in Europe < 3 years		
	3-5 years	0.60	1.47
	6-10 years	0.51	1.75
	11 plus	0.10***	0.61
Age at migration	Ref. Younger than 25		
	25-34	3.14**	0.95
	35 and over	3.24	2.72
Gender	Female (ref. male)	0.71	1.21
Education	Some tertiary (Ref. Less)	3.05*	0.69
Living standard	Suf. income in HH to cover basic needs (ref. No)	1.74	8.15**
Employment	Employed (ref. no)	0.76	0.55
Legal status	Legal status (ref. no)	45.60***	16.92**
Partner	Has a partner in Europe (ref. no)	0.79	5.18*
	Has a partner in Origin (ref. no)	2.53	2.81
Children	Has a child in Europe (ref. no)	0.09***	0.36*
	Has a child in Origin (ref. no)	5.02**	4.24***
	Has a child in Other country (ref. no)	2.84	2.73
Relatives	Has other relatives/friends in Europe (ref.no)	0.63	1
Remittances	Remitted to DR Congo (ref. no)	0.49	0.18***
Visits	Visited DR Congo (ref. no)	0.10**	3.12**
Reason for migration	Reasons for migration (ref. family)		
	Economic reasons	0.48	0.49
	Study reasons	4.3*	6.84**
	Political reasons	0.11***	0.31**
	Others	0.31*	0.60
	Person-year observations	5074	5074
	Events	52	52
	Egos	468	468

Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Variables reflecting integration in Belgium and the United Kingdom are factors in return, but in different ways. While the employment status of migrants does not influence return, the living conditions in the household where migrants live in Belgium and the United Kingdom and legal status does play a role. On the one hand, migrants who live in a household with sufficient or more than sufficient resources to meet the needs of its members are more likely to return than those who live in households that are experiencing economic difficulties, all else being equal. This result indicates that return requires a high living standard; individuals with means are the most likely to return. This suggests that for the most part return migration is not motivated by failure, but by a choice to return, probably with savings in order not to be dependent on others upon arrival. The effect of legal status also suggests voluntary returns by the successful, in that having legal status in the destination country strongly increases the chances of return: migrants who are legal residents of the destination country were much more likely to return than those without legal residency. Obtaining papers allow migrants to come and go more freely between DR Congo and Europe: people are more likely to return if it is possible to leave again if their reintegration in Congo proves

difficult (Flahaux, 2009; Flahaux et al., 2010). This result thus also shows that most returns are not expulsions.

The location of family also influences return to DR Congo, albeit not strongly. Migrants with a spouse in Belgium or the United Kingdom seem to be more likely to return, but the result is not strongly significant. Neither does the spouse's presence in DR Congo affect the chances of return. The Congolese norm, indeed, is for migrants to try to bring their spouses to Europe, and many would consider returning without having succeeded in this as a failure.

The presence of children in Europe has a small impact on return. It appears that migrants having children in Europe are less likely to return. On the other hand, the regression shows that migrants who had left a child in the country were three times more likely to return than those who had not. This reflects migrants' desire to live with their children who have remained in the country. We will not interpret the final scenario, the positive effect on return of having a child elsewhere, as it bears only on a very small number of cases. The presence of a wider social network at the destination does not seem to play a role in migrants' return.

Two variables were intended to capture the role of ties maintained with DR Congo on migrants' return. First, migrants who send regular remittances to DR Congo are less likely to return than those who do not do so. The literature suggests that the family that has remained in the country discourages migrants to return, especially when they can remit (Bongo-Pasi Moké Sangol and Tsakala Munikengi, 2004). In this sense, remitting is an indicator of the reliance of the family of migrants on these money transfers. The second indicator of ties measures the occurrence of visits. Migrants who have already returned for a brief stay in DR Congo are more likely to then undertake a "true" return with the intention of settling in the country. It indicates that migrants who maintain contact with the country before returning.

Returns are also influenced by the circumstances in which departure occurred. Migrants who left DR Congo for economic reasons are no more or less likely to return than those who migrated for family reasons. Those who left to study in Belgium or the United Kingdom were more likely to return. This result specifically concerns migrants who went to Belgium before the 1990s, when scholarships were available, who were assured of finding a good job and good living conditions on their return to DR Congo. Migrants who had fled DR Congo for political reasons, on the other hand, are less likely to return. Indeed, the circumstances of these migrants' departure lead to a profound break in their relations with the country, and the continued absence of stability and security there pushes them to remain abroad.

Congolese migrants who go to Europe, and more specifically to Belgium and the United Kingdom, are among the most highly educated individuals in the country. Not only do they aspire to capitalize on their qualifications and potential by trying their luck abroad, but the fact that they already hold such a qualification means that they have greater chances of obtaining a visa to live in Europe. The most educated migrants are also more likely to return to DR Congo than others, however. Thus, return migration does not really amplify the initial selection in favour of the migration of the most educated Congolese. More precisely, the migrants who are most likely to return are those who, having already completed tertiary education, left the DR Congo in order to study in Europe. These Congolese set out with the idea of returning after acquiring specific human capital, which would allow them to find a high-quality job or take on positions of responsibility on their return. This was particularly the case before 1990, when scholarships from international and foreign institutions and from the Congolese government allowing Congolese students to go abroad to specialize were not uncommon. These students were assured of finding a job and favourable living conditions on their return to DR Congo. However, return seems to be a less central concern for Congolese who leave for reasons other than study, even if they already have a high level of education on departure. Those who left for political reasons have distended their links with DR Congo, and have generally failed to return.

While for the Congolese, as we have seen, migration requires a certain amount of human capital, it also requires financial means, both for departure and for return. For departure, the administrative processes required to obtain a visa are costly, as is the cost of the voyage, and it is important to have savings to meet one's needs over the first months in the destination country. Having some financial capital is thus essential. In fact, those who leave DR Congo for Europe are generally individuals from relatively well-off households. In contrast, individuals who work or own property are not the most likely to migrate. Indeed, those who do not earn a living in an autonomous fashion can sometimes have their migration financed by members of their contact circle. Individuals whose spouse or children are abroad are also more likely to migrate, and it is more than likely that the latter will contribute financially to family reunification in the destination country. Members of the wider social network in the destination country may also contribute to the costs of migration, which may be reflected in the greater probability of migration among those with such ties abroad. On the other hand return also requires means, and those who return are also typically part of households with means in Belgium or the United Kingdom. However, the high costs of migration and of integration in the destination country do not offer migrants an incentive to take risks to return to DR Congo: few Congolese who have financed their migration themselves subsequently return.

Social networks strongly determine the departures and returns of Congolese migrants. A major concern of migrants is to bring their families into a stable and secure context,

such as in Europe. The presence of a family member – and notably the spouse - in Europe thus strongly influence the likelihood of moving to Europe (see also Vause, 2012). In contrast, individuals whose spouse is in DR Congo are less likely to leave the country. The displacement of the family nucleus to the destination is thus important, but beyond this, the stabilization of the family in the destination country and the acquisition of freedom of movement are also important in Congolese migration. Return migration is low (see MAFE working paper 19), but the migrants who were most likely to return were those who had a legal status in the destination country. Obtaining an administrative status that facilitates movements between DR Congo and Europe allows Congolese migrants to take the risk of returning to their country of origin, and come back to Europe if the return fails.

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